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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
should be compensation.2 3 On the other hand, courts have held that if
there is alternate access, there may be no compensation.2
4
Though the impairment of access may be claimed as a damage to
the market value of the land in an eminent domain proceeding, the re-
routing of traffic may not.25 Such a re-routing is an element of the
State's police power. Nonetheless, when compensation is given on the
remainder of the property, as in the instant case, using the present-past
market value test, loss of business due to deviation of traffic is vicari-
ously considered and may have a direct effect upon that market value.
It is submitted that in the instant case the distinction between the
impairment of access and the diversion of traffic is theoretically de-
fensible, but, as a practical matter, is too subtle to be adequately handled
by a jury of lay persons. Viewing the situation realistically, the distinc-
tion should not be used except in cases in which only traffic diversion
is being claimed as the damage.
It is further submitted that courts have not made it clear whether
they characterize access as a license or easement and allow this deter-
mination to control the nature of the proceeding; or conversely,
whether the type of proceeding is defined and the nature of the property
right simply made to fit. It appears no general procedure prevails.
However, courts are more likely to decide the type of action before the
character of the property right if the character of the right is considered
at all.
HORTON B. KOESSLER.
JURIES ARE NOT CAPABLE TRIERS OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY OR
UNDUE INFLUENCE IN WILL CONTEST CASES.- The testator, a successful
opthalmologist, was married and had two sons aged 12 and 14 years.
Five years before his death, the testator's wife obtained an interlocu-
tory decree of divorce which precipitated from an intimate relationship
between the testator and his receptionist.
Mollandin v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 14 Fed. 394 (1882); Idaho & W.N.R.R. v. Nagle,
184 Fed. 598 (9th Cir. 1911); Lund v. Idaho & W.N.R.R. 50 Wash 574, 97 Pac. 665
(1908). All the decisions were made under constitutional provisions which provided
for both taking and damage. One court in determining compensation has said:
When . . . ingress and egress to abutting property has been destroyed or
substantially impaired he (the abutter) may recover damage therefore. The
damages may be merely nominal or they may be severe. Other means of
access . . . may be taken into consideration in determining the amount which
would be just under the circumstances. (citing cases) Other means of access
may mitigate damages (citing cases), but does not constitute a defense to
the action.
State v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988, 992 (1960).
24See note 12 supra. It is also interesting to note, if a new road is constructed where
none existed before and insufficient or no access is provided, there may be no claim
for compensation because there was no access prior to the construction of the road.
Schnider v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 439, 241 P.2d 1 (1952); see generally 43 A.L.R.2d
1068 (1955).
OSee generally, 73 A.L.R.2d 680 and following annotations. 118 A.L.R. 921 indicates
some contrary holdings which are in the minority.
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On February 1, 1959, the testator entered a hospital with terminal
cancer. On February 12, he executed a will in which he made his sons
beneficiaries of a $100,000 insurance policy. His receptionist was desig-
nated the residuary legatee. On March 31, the testator executed his final
will which differed in effect from the prior will only insofar as it pro-
vided that the insurance proceeds be placed in trust for the children and
that all the estate taxes be satisfied solely from the proceeds of the in-
surance policy. The receptionist would benefit in excess of $10,000 by
this change.
During the period of his confinement, the physical condition of the
testator rapidly deteriorated and he was given large, sustained doses
of drugs. The receptionist spent a great deal of time with the testator
during his final illness and helped manage his business affairs during
this time. The testator died the following April 5.
The testator's divorced wife contested the final will on behalf of
the children claiming that the testator lacked testamentary capacity
at the time of execution and that the will was a product of the undue
influence of the receptionist proponent. The jury found for the con-
testant on both issues and the final will was denied probate. On appeal
to the Supreme Court of California, held, reversed. The order denying
probate is reversed and the trial court instructed to admit the will to
probate. The record does not sustain the findings of the jury. In re
Estate of Ulrich A. Fritschi, 33 Cal.Rptr. 264, 384 P.2d 656 (1963).
The instant case involves a will particularly susceptible to contest;
the disposition of property is "unnatural"1 and factors exist upon which
allegations of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity can
be based. Further, it is illustrative of the common jury reaction to such
a contested will. The court in the instant case noted that the jury finds
for the contestant in over 75 percent of the cases submitted to it and
that such has been said to be proper subject of judicial notice.2 Robert
Grant, a Probate Judge in Boston, in his book, LAW AND THE FAMILY,
indicated the consistency with which contested wills are restored to pro-
bate by appellate courts :3
[In spite of numerous attacks on wills, a steady average
of less than 1 per cent have been disallowed by appellate courts.]
a result which is made more remarkable by the reminder
that some of these were set aside because of defective attesta-
tion instead of the mental incapacity and undue influence of
the maker, ordinarily urged by the rapacious. The statistics for
the same period show a yearly average of less than 1% of wills
compromised - that is, where the legatees and next of kin agreed
to split their differences with the sanction of the court.
'That is, the disposition is unlike that provided by intestate succession statutes. See
CAL. PROB. CODE § 221 and REVISED CODES OP MONTANA, 1947, § 91-403.
'Instant case at 659.
'Noted in Taft, Comments on Will Contests in New York, 30 YALE L. J. 593, 599
(1920-21).
1963]
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It is rather surprising, however, that the showing on the
side of validity should be so good considering the haphazard
and hasty, if not sloppy, execution of so many wills.
Juries are prompted to find undue influence and lack of testamentary
capacity by considering things other than the legal criteria involved.
The "unnatural" disposition of property under the will often seems to
influence their decision. Sympathy for the natural heirs and the emo-
tional overlays of the trial interfere with impartiality.4 Not only do
their unwarranted findings give rise to further litigation but also they
confront appellate courts with a conflict. Appellate courts are hesitant
to overturn the factual findings of trial courts which have had the ad-
vantage of seeing and hearing the testimony of the witnesses. They will
not do so unless there is no substantial evidence in the record to sup-
port that finding.5 There is, however, a fundamental policy, which juries
do not seem to appreciate, requiring that a testator be able to dispose
of his property as he sees fit and that such right does not depend upon
its judicious use.8 The mental capacity required by law to exercise the
right to dispose of property is less demanding than is regularly sup-
posed by juries. Jury misunderstanding of these requirements leads, at
least in part, to their consistent denial of the will. Laymen are inherently
limited in dealing with the problem of mental capacity7 and are prone
to consider evidence touching their common knowledge but which is not
a criterion set down by law.
In the instant case, part of contestant's attack was based upon the
idiosyncracies and fatal illness of the testator. It was demonstrated that
he had displayed irrationality and a "disturbed attitude" toward one of
his children. Such evidence is often seized upon by contestants yet it
fails to reach the legal standard of incapacity. A testator is presumed
to be sane and to have sufficient mental capacity to make a valid will.
The burden is on the contestant of the will to show a lack of the requisite
capacity at the time of execution by a preponderance of the evidence.8
When applied to the capacity required to make a valid will, the word
incompetent should be construed to apply to any person, whether sane
or insane, who is by reason of old age, disease, weakness of mind, or other
cause, unable to understand what property he has, the relationship
which he bears to those who would naturally be the objects of his bounty,
and the disposition of his property he is making.9
The primary impact of contestant's arguments rested upon the as-
sertion of drug induced incompetence. This evidence indicated a sus-
tained administration of drugs to the testator capable of impairing men-
'ATKINSON, WILLS 140 (2d ed. 1953).
5In re Cissel's Estate, 104 Mont. 306, 66 P.2d 779 (1937).
'In re Silver's Estate, 98 Mont. 141, 38 P.2d 277 (1934); In re McDevitt's Estate,
95 Cal. 17, 30 Pac. 101 (1892).
'See ATKINSON, note 4 supra.
'In re Benson's Estate, 110 Mont. 25, 98 P.2d 868 (1940); In re Estate of Lingen-
felter, 38 Cal. 2d 571, 580, 241 P.2d 990 (1952).
'In re Cummings' Estate, 92 Mont. 185, 11 P.2d 968 (1932); In re Estate of Smith,
200 Cal. 152, 252 Pac. 325 (1926).
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tal ability because of known side effects.'0 The drugs used to alleviate
pain caused by such diseases as cancer include morphine, codeine, Dilau-
did, Demerol and methadone. These drugs are analgesics which act to
suppress the pain registering function of the brain itself. They do so by:
(1) raising the threshold of pain perception (the primary effect) ; (2) by
the side effect of removing the usual responses to pain such as anxiety,
fear, panic, withdrawal and flight; and (3) by inducing sleep which
itself raises the pain threshold." Side effects may act to relieve an indi-
vidual of some of his natural inhibitions or precautionary instincts and
it is known that the side effects outlast the pain relieving effects, some-
times by many hours. 1 2 The side effects do not prove mental impair-
ment for a period following the administration of drugs but they are a
factor to be considered. 13
The development of tolerance to drugs provides a counter-balancing
force to the side effects. Tolerance develops through a sustained usage
of drugs and the presence of pain greatly increases tolerance.
The more severe the pain, the larger is the dose of opiate re-
quired and the greater the amount of drug that can be tolerated.
.... This is in keeping with the general principle that the de-
gree of stupefication caused by a given amount of a depressant
drug is directly proportional to the level of reflex excitability
of the nervous system. 14
As the tolerance to the drug itself increases, so increases the tolerance
to the side effects.15 In cases not involving drug usage, the jury's atten-
tion must be directed to the particular facts and circumstances surround-
ing the testator at the time of execution of the will. A consideration
of all the effects of drugs and the awareness that reactions vary with
the individual person under varying circumstances indicates that the
criterion for drug induced incapacity should still be the observed mental
condition of the patient. Certainly, contestant's testimony on general
side effects and reactions because of drug usage falls short of establish-
ing mental incompetence.
Despite this, an appealing case is made for the jury by displaying
the available 'information in side effects. Such information coincides
with the common knowledge and experience the jury is likely to pos-
sess. The treatment of drug usage in literature generally has not been
to demonstrate its medical value but rather to portray an illegal, immoral
use. The user is often set out as abnormal and incompetent. It is this
concept of drug usage which is likely to exist in the mind of the jury.
Further, testimony as to side effects of drugs may be a particularly
fine attack in jurisdictions such as Montana which indulge a presump-
"See generally, for an excellent discussion of this area, Sharpe, Medication as a Threat
to Testamentary Capacity, 35 N.C.L. REV. 380 (1956-57).
"Wolff, Hardy, Goodell, Studies on Pain, 19 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 659 (1940).
"2HARDY, WOLFF, GOODELL, PAIN SENSATIONS AND REACTIONS 344 (1952).
"Nunn v. Williams, 254 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1953).
"GOODMAN AND GILMAN, THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 248 (2d ed.
1955).
'Miller v. Oestrich, 157 Pa. 264, 27 Atl. 742 (1893).
19631
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tion of continuing incapacity once such a condition is shown to exist
and to be of a lasting and enduring variety. Section 93-1301(1) of the
Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, provides: "A thing once proved to
exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature." Montana
courts have made this statute applicable to will contests involving
lunacy and insanity.16 Such a presumption places a very substantial
burden upon the proponents of the will to show that it was executed
during a lucid interval. If the courts are willing to allow such a pre-
sumption in cases of insanity it is possible that it would also be allowed
in cases of a sustained use of drugs.
The other ground proposed by the contestant for finding the will
invalid was that of undue influence upon the testator by the proponent.
The proponent did not actively participate in procuring the contested
will. She was not present at the signing of the will nor at the discus-
sions leading up to it. She did seek a witness at the request of the at-
torney and her pen was used for signing the will. A confidential rela-
tionship existed between the proponent and the testator and she had
both the motivation and the opportunity to influence him. It is not suf-
ficient that the testator may have been influenced by the beneficiary
in consequence of their fiduciary relationship. Lawful influence aris-
ing from family and social relations may have its natural results even
if it influences last wills. Only when the influence exercised is exerted
over the very act of devising and prevents the will from being the act
of the testator is it grounds for invalidating the will. 17 The influence
must be such as to amount to coercion, destroying the free agency of
the testator at the time of the execution of the will and must directly
procure its execution.is The jury found undue influence in the instant
case without a substantial basis in the evidence, much as they found
testamentary incapacity.
No Montana decision involving a will contest based on drug induced
testamentary incapacity has been found. However, the administration
of drugs to those confined with terminal disease is not infrequent and
an attorney should consider how he would approach the drafting of a
will under such circumstances. A jury is less likely to find testamentary
incapacity, as the jury did in the instant case, if certain'precautionary
measures are taken. Precautions can most effectively be taken at the
time of the execution of the will since it is at that time that the testator
must be possessed of testamentary capacity and free of undue influence.
Often an individual is faced with the possibility of an imminent
death before he takes steps to procure the drafting of his will. In the
instance of one confined with a terminal disease it is particularly im-
portant to execute the instrument as early as is practicable. As time
passes, the condition of the testator may worsen and he may be admin-
istered larger dosages of drugs to dull increasing pain. In this regard,
it may be beneficial to consult the attending physician. Doctors are gen-
erally not informed of the gravity of making a will nor are they likely
16In re Murphy's Estate, 43 Mont. 353, 373, 116 Pa. 1004 (1911).
"Hale v. Smith, 73 Mont. 481, 237 Pac. 214 (1925).1 In re Bright's Estate, 89 Mont. 394, 300 Pac. 229 (1931).
[Vol. 25,
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to understand the low degree of mental capacity required by law to exer-
cise the right to dispose of property. Enlightening the doctor in these
respects may encourage him to do what he can to put the testator in an
improved mental condition, at least for a short time. If such an act
would interfere with medical ethics, the doctor mught be able to indi-
cate the time during which the testator is the least affected by drugs.
Further, the doctor should be made a witness to the execution of the
will. Nurses also make effective witnesses. 19 These are the most influ-
ential attestors to sound mind and memory because professional train-
ing and ability allows them to arrive at the most accurate ascertain-
ment of mental competency. An account of the testator's capacity from
such witnesses based on firsthand knowledge is far more convincing
than hypothetical questions directed to medical experts at the time of
contest.
The process of eliciting from medical experts answers to
hypothetical questions concerning mental capacity, has come to
be a highly artificial and a wholly unconvincing performance.
Both juries and the courts largely ignore such evidence, seek-
ing as a basis for their deductions evidence showing objectively
capacity of a testator to attend intelligently to his current af-
fairs. The refinements of the medical science applied as they are
to facts postulated in an interminable question prepared by coun-
sel, interests them chiefly as intellectual gymnastics. They
usually dismiss the learned medical disquisitions with ill-con-
cealed amusement.20
While the witnesses are present, the will should be read to the testator
so that he can be positively said to know its contents and to assent there-
to. This act will impress the occasion upon the minds of the witnesses
and afford evidence that the testator is aware of his property, the ob-
jects of his bounty and the disposition of the property that he is mak-
ing. A simple will rather than a complex disposition of property is ad-
vised under these circumstances as there is some authority that less men-
tal capacity is needed for a simple disposition of property. 21 Certainly
this proposition should be logical and appealing to a jury and make
them more willing to credit the testator's ability to understand his prop-
erty disposition.
Another precaution, that of having a psychiatric examination, is of
somewhat limited application but may be worth considering under cer-
tain circumstances. Psychiatrists may not be available in a small com-
munity and there is a risk of creating doubt in the minds of the jury
that the attorney himself believes the testator to be sane or competent.
If, however, the premise of a lucid interval is to be established, 22 a psy-
chiatric examination is particularly valuable. 23
"in re Sales' Estate, 108 Mont. 202, 89 P.2d 1043 (1939).
"See note 3 supra at 603.
'In re Holmstrom's Estate, 208 Minn. 19, 292 N.W. 622 (1940); 57 AM. JUR. Wills
§ 66 at 83.
'See page 172 supra on the presumption of continued incapacity.
'Usdin, The Psychiatrist and Testamentary Capacity, 32 TuL. L. REv. 89, 100 (1957-
58).
1963]
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Although juries are notably incapable triers of testamentary capa-
city and undue influence, the foregoing precautionary measures in the
drafting and execution of the will provide a means by which to avoid
a jury denial of a will in a contest proceeding. These precautions should
discourage one from a contest against even an "unnatural" will and af-
ford a much stronger case with which to convince the jury if there is a
contest.
ROBERT T. BAXTER.
PRELIMINARY HEARING IS A CRITICAL STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING AT
WHICH THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT IS REQUIRED TO HAVE THE ASSIST-
ANCE OF CouNSEL.--Defendant, Robert Galloway White, was arrested
on May 27, 1960. He was charged with murder and both assault and
robbery with a deadly weapon. The preliminary hearing was postponed
and not held until August 9, 1960.1 The defendant, who was not repre-
sented by counsel, entered a plea of guilty at the hearing. The defendant
was called before the Criminal Court of Baltimore for arraignment on
September 8, 1960, but because he was not represented by counsel at
that time the arraignment was postponed. On the following day counsel
was appointed to represent him. The arraignment was held on Novem-
ber 25, 1960 and the defendant entered pleas of "not guilty" and "not
guilty by reason of insanity." At the trial the guilty plea which had
been entered at the preliminary hearing was introduced into evidence
without objection. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death.
On appeal to the Maryland Court of Appeals, 2 the defendant contended
that the failure of the state to afford him appointed counsel at the pre-
liminary hearing violated his constitutional rights to counsel. On
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed.
In a per curiam opinion the Court held the preliminary hearing to be a
critical stage of the proceedings and stated that because the defendant
had not been afforded counsel at this stage he was denied his constitu-
tional right to counsel.3 Setting aside any consideration of prejudice, the
Justices agreed that the presence of counsel at the preliminary hearing
was necessary to enable the accused to know how to plead intelligently.
White v. State of Maryland, 373 U. S. 59 (1963).
The right of a defendant to representation by counsel of his own
choosing has long been recognized and guaranteed in both state and fed-
'The August ninth hearing is not mentioned in the report of the appeal of the con-
viction to the Maryland Court of Appeals. White v. State of Md., 227 Md. 615, 177
A.2d 877 (1962). The record there indicates the defendant was charged before a
magistrate on May 30, 1960. The reasons given for this four day delay were the
continued investigation of a co-defendant's connection with the crime and a sharp
curtailment of magistrates' sittings over the Memorial Day weekend. The United
States Supreme Court report of the case mentions neither the May 30 hearing nor
the reasons for the delay in having a preliminary hearing.
'White v. State of Md., 227 Md. 615, 177 A.2d 877 (1962).
'Upon return of the case to the Maryland Court of Appeals that court reversed the
conviction in the Criminal Court of Baltimore and remanded the case for a new trial
in accordance with the opinion of the United States Supreme Court. White v. State
of Md., 231 Md. 533, 191 A.2d 237 (1963).
[Vol. 25,
7
Baxter: In re Estate of Ulrich A. Fritschi
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1963
